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Private Public Partnerships (PPP) are getting established in an increasing rate. They are seen as 
perfect substitutes to traditional procurement of public goods and services, like education, health care 
or infrastructure. Their objective is to deliver the public goods / services to the public in higher 
efficiency, higher quality and contribute to the country´s economic growth.  
This thesis analyses modern PPPs and why some of them tend to fail in the long run. For this thesis, 
failure means the PPP becomes a public company, has high transaction costs or gained a bad 
reputation during its operation period, because the public has to carry the main costs of the potential 
malfunction.  
To reach the thesis objective, the thesis is split in two main parts: the theoretical approach and the 
case study. The theoretical approach evaluates of PPPs on the theoretical level, the case study gives a 
real-life example for a PPP, the “Toll Collect GmbH” from Germany.  
 
During the research for both approaches, several factors and issues emerged considering the PPP-
performance. These findings are the main focus in the discussion and are vital for the overall PPP-
success. The research findings indicate that human misbehaviour (opportunism, etc.), internal 
problems between the partners (conflict of interest), the bias reliability of the available “hard data” 
and planning mistakes on microeconomic level are responsible for a PPP-failure. These findings are 
related to other issues regarding transparency, monitoring and cost handling of PPPs. 
To reduce the failure rate for the future, the thesis proposes a better governance structure with an 
independent audit body, CSR standards for the project partners and the higher consideration of 
scientific research in that field during the planning period.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the thesis  
 
With an increasing rate, Public private partnerships (PPPs) are developing in the 
economies around the world. According to their supporters, PPPs are a perfect 
substitute for traditional procurement of public goods and services1 (Newman, 2017). 
They emerge in different public sectors like education, health care and infrastructure, 
sectors which have a vital influence on people´s lives. Over the years, PPPs have come 
to be seen as an alternative way to deliver certain services to the population of a 
country or region. They are also viewed as a new way to do business between the 
public and private investors.  
 
In Germany, PPPs have also become a part of the economic landscape and are part of 
any political discussion about the future model of the country´s economy. However, 
the view of the media and the general public is that PPPs in Germany tend to fail in 
their current form during their operation period and have a negative consequence on 
the state which result in citizens having to carry the costs of the failure (Bedszent, 
2018).  
 
1.2 Thesis objective  
 
The main thesis objective is to analyse present-day PPPs, using modern economic 
methods and models. This analysis aims to answer the question if the implementation 
of PPPs nowadays is a senseful contribution to a country´s economic growth and which 
factors and risks are responsible for a PPP-failure. Therefore, this paper also evaluates 
the causes of possible failure and provide solutions to decrease the failure rate of PPPs.  
 
 
 
1 Public goods/service are goods or services which have two key features: non-rivalry, meaning quality 
   does not diminish when more people using it, and non-excludability, meaning people cannot be 
   prevented from using the good or service. For example air, water etc. (Kotchen, 2014). In case of 
   PPPs, the focus is more on public goods/services which have an industrial background, meaning  
   infrastructure, education, water supply etc. 
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To reach the main objective, this study takes different scientific literature and the case 
study as main sources for this thesis. An empirical research is not included in the thesis 
due to the time intensity of such an extensive research and the limited access to relevant 
information. Therefore, this paper uses the research outcomes of other researchers as 
a part of the theoretical approach, the case study as a basis of practical approaches. 
The choice of these methods has the purpose of narrowing the results to the highest 
possible accuracy.  
 
There are also two sub-goals for this thesis. The first sub-goal is to give the reader an 
overall understanding of the idea and structure of PPPs. The second sub-goal is to 
represent current and previous academic works of other researchers and the outcomes 
of those academic works to the reader.  
 
The aim of the thesis is to support policy makers, public representatives and investors 
in their decision making and provide significant information for the planning – and 
operation process. This outcome should achieve the reduction of PPP-failure rates, 
protect the interests of the stake- / shareholders, increase the probability for long-term 
success and lead to sustainable economic growth.  
 
1.3 The scope of the thesis  
 
This thesis focuses on two main factors: PPPs and the reasons for their failure.  
The thesis describes failing PPPs, not successful PPPs. This decision ensures the 
fulfilment of the main thesis objective. Positive PPP-traits are mentioned, only for the 
context behind them.  
Also, the thesis does not explain relevant legislation, some relevant economic factors 
and theoretical outcomes in detail, because it would exceed the thesis extent and the 
formal thesis requirements. To compensate, this thesis will describe those points in a 
superficial, understandable way.  
Other mentionable limitations and information are noted in the footnotes.     
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1.4 Summary of the thesis  
 
The thesis is split in 3 main chapters: the theory of PPPs, the case study and the 
discussion.  
Chapter two defines a PPPs, portrays the structure, presents their main features and 
displays an evaluation process for their performance. This chapter should provide the 
reader a neutral, structural image of a PPP. Chapter three and four go deeper in the 
economic theory. Chapter three represents the macroeconomic theory behind PPPs. 
The reader find in this chapter models and the main arguments policy makers make 
for a PPP to the public. Chapter four presents the microeconomic theory. Here, the 
author describes the optimization problems of both project partners in a mathematical 
way and their relationship in economic terms.  
Chapter five is the case study about a German PPP called “Toll Collect GmbH”. The 
function of this PPP is to collect tolls from all HGVs on German motorways (Toll 
Collect GmbH, 2019). In chapter five describes the idea, structure and the current 
status of this PPP and the reasons why it failed.  
In chapter six, the author discusses the findings of chapter four and five to answer the 
question why PPPs fail in present days.    
Chapter seven analyses the major issues of PPPs. These issues are equally important 
for the thesis topic.  
Chapter eight suggests solutions in purpose to diminish the rate of PPP-failure and to 
increase their efficiency before and during the operation time.  
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2.  THE NATURE OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  
 
2.1 Definition and features of Public Private Partnerships 
 
Finding a precise and final definition of what public private partnerships are, is 
difficult. There are a variety of ways to define PPPs. According to Hodge and Greve 
(2005), one possible definition is that “PPPs are projects which generally involves the 
design, construction, financing and maintenance of a public good by the private sector 
under a long-term contract”.2 This definition has three advantages. First, it is simple, 
like mentioned there are a lot of different attempts to define a PPP, so there is a need 
to break it into the main points. Second, it gives already a hint to which factors are 
flowing into such a partnership. Third, it gives a clear understanding on the foundation 
of a PPP.  
 
The idea behind a PPP is that the responsible agent3 transfers the responsibility of a 
public-owned good to a private company under a legal contract, whose conditions are 
negotiated before. Figure 1 shows the scope of responsibilities between public and 
private. So, PPPs are a collaboration of two parties. They are mostly single project-
driven, so they don´t cover a large variety of goods and services (Newman, 2017). For 
governments, PPP is seen as a new tool for managing public services, the private 
company sees it as a new source of revenue within a competitive market.  
 
 
 
 
2 For this thesis, the author sticks to this definition. There are many more definitions about PPPs but to  
   simplify the author will use this.  
3 A city, county or state 
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Figure 1 Scope of private and public responsibility (adapted from Roehrich, 2014)  
Elisabeth Iossa (2015) characterizes PPPs in her article ”The Simple Microeconomics 
of PPP” in three main features: bundling, risk transfer and long term contract.  
 
1) Bundling: Iossa understands under bundling different kinds of modelling a 
partnership and to operate it. It describes which models bundles which tasks or services 
are contracted to a ”consortium” of private firms (Iossa, 2015). For example, the 
DFBO-Model (design, finance, build and operate4).  
 
2) Risk Transfer: Compared to the common ways of procurement, according to Iossa, 
PPPs contain a greater transfer of risk and responsibility to the private partners. The 
state gives basic instructions and requirements to the contractors. They convert these 
basic requirements into a business model which delivers the needed service to the 
customer. The private-sector-part hold the control and responsibility over the service 
but possess also the operational and constructional risk (Iossa, 2015).  
 
3) Long-Term Contract: The key issue with negotiating a partnership contract is risk 
sharing of investment, responsibility and rewards (Newman, 2017). This key issue has 
a high priority in designing a contract due the fact it is binding for both factions during 
the operation period. The contract is the founding document of the partnership, it 
describes the structure, details and tasks of the project partners. Additionally, it 
 
4 Those are the tasks for the private company  
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regulates the contribution of benefits and profits of the project among the agents. The 
contract stands under legal law of the respective country. This is relevant in the case 
of contractual disputes or potential conflicts in the future (Newman, 2017). Such 
contracts last around twenty to thirty-five years (Iossa, 2015). 
 
2.2 Structure of a typical PPP 
 
Structuring a PPP can be complex depending the results of contracting and the 
participating parties. A typical simple structure of a PPP is presented in Figure 2:  
 
 
Figure 2 Typical structure of PPP (adapted from World Bank guide, 2017, p. 41) 
Figure 2 shows the connections between the different bodies of the PPP. The figure 
can be divided in three levels: the upper part is the public sector, the level beginning 
with the project company is the private sector and the level with the red box is the 
consumption sector with all the customers. The levels gives an impression of the 
separation of tasks beneath the parties. Between the government and the project 
company, a contract is signed which builds the legal framework of the overall project.  
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In the private sector level, it shows which third parties, such as investors, planning 
companies (EPC) and lenders, are connected to the project and their relationship5 with 
the PPP company.  
 
One additional aspect to remark is the streams of funding. Financing and revenue 
expectations are playing an important role in planning and constructing the project. 
Like every basic business model, it is necessary to observe profit and cost development 
to make this project successful and beneficial for all parties. The main investors of the 
project are called ”equity shareholders” (World Bank, 2017). Lenders are banks and 
insurance companies, provide financial security.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 Flow of Funds within a PPP (adapted from World Bank guide, 2017, p. 42) 
Figure 3 displays all the funding streams inside this simple PPP-model. The main 
sources of income is a combination of financial support by share- and stakeholders of 
the project and the fees from the users of the service. The main cost burdens are the 
delivery6 of the service to the users/customers and the debts to the investors and 
lenders.  
 
5 The author will not explain the single contractors and their functions one by one, because it is not his 
   goal for this chapter. To read more about it, the author recommends the ”PPP reference guide Version 
   3”of the World Bank. This thesis will focus only on the economic relationship between public and 
   private sector. 
6 Maintenance etc. 
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2.3 Forms of PPPs 
 
As mentioned, the varieties of PPPs nowadays are divers. However, there are two 
overall types of partnerships which differ from the contract types and their 
arrangements (see Appendix 1).  
 
1) Social partnerships: social partnerships refer to arrangements in specific areas of the 
public sector, which affects the social life of a country´s citizen. These arrangements 
arise in the sectors of education, childcare and healthcare. The main purpose behind 
these forms of PPP is to increase the capacity and efficiency of public services (World 
Bank, 2017). 
 
2) Economic partnerships: The intention of economic partnership is to improve already 
existing industrial areas and to increase returns for all contractual partners. This 
happens in infrastructure projects, waste disposal and in the finance sector. These 
partnerships should boost economic growth and employment in those industrial sectors 
(World Bank, 2017).  
 
2.3.1 Privatizations 
 
Before PPPs became more prevalent in modern-day public planning, another form was 
considered to solve problems: privatizations7. This type is one higher level than the 
PPP. Privatizations means the complete transfer of responsibility and management of 
a service to the private sector without contractual or structural arrangements or the 
transformation of a former public company into a private company. The public sector 
is not part of any recent or future decision-making process and can control only the 
company via the established legislation. The motives for engaging a privatization are 
similar to the PPP. It promises high profit and new jobs, the public sector benefits from 
collecting taxes.  
 
 
7 Privatizations are an extreme form and not exactly a PPP. This chapter should only give the reader an  
  impression of the next possible alternative besides a PPP.  
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The problems with privatizations become clear when they run a service in the long-
term. Those problems are numerous, and it depends on the section where the 
privatization is running.  
The main issues8 with privatizations are the natural monopoly it creates, the price 
stability and the limited possibility to regulate it. Through handing over a specific 
service9 to a single company, the state creates a private monopoly on this service. A 
good example in that case is the Deutsche Bahn AG10 (Connoly, 2018). It controls all 
rail ways in Germany and have full market power. This prevents competition fully. 
Also because of monopoly, prices can fluctuate, even rise in the long-term, to cover 
expenditures and return expectations. The issue for the government is that it does not 
have any control or influence on any kinds of developments. In some cases, the 
government has to compensate the financial liabilities of the privatization. 
   
Because of these disputes, there is a need for the government to keep the public 
interests safe against such outbursts of private mismanagement. Therefore, PPPs 
represent a safe substitute. The big advantage of PPPs compared to privatizations is 
the contractual foundation which clearly states each parties’ responsibilities and limits 
their power. A government can now assure itself against uncertainties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 There are many more issues, here the author summarizes briefly only three, to keep focus on the 
    actual subject. 
9 Famous privatized industries are water supply, railways or telecommunication 
10 German railway company 
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2.4 Performance evaluation process 
 
Evaluating the performance of a PPP is a crucial step to evaluate the definite success 
of the project itself and its effect on a country´s economy. There are different ways to 
measurement the performance, but up until 2018, these were mostly theoretical 
(Osborne, 2000). Campos11  in 2018 developed an evaluation system, which is based 
on empirical researches and literature reviews about PPPs (Campos, 2018). The 
outcome of this review is the designation of critical success factors (see Appendix 2). 
Figure 4 summarizes the foundation for Campos’ performance model based on the 
CSFs. To determine the relevance and weight of a CSF on the overall performance 
result, Campos creates a questionnaire which he contributes to several project partners. 
Through the questionnaire12, the partners clarify which factors have higher priority in 
securing the project’s success. Campos reorders the CSFs to groups (“dimensions”), 
which he also reorders in head groups (“construct”). Each construct contains three 
dimensions.  
 
 
Figure 4 PPP performance model (adapted from Campos, 2018) 
 
11 The author chooses this approach of performance evaluation because its more recent and up to date.  
12 A 5-point scale ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree” (Campos, 2018) 
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According to Campos’ article, the construct “microenvironment” shows the highest 
relation to the project’s performance, followed by the construct “abilities of parties” 
(Campos, 2018). The construct ”macroenvironment” is still significant to the 
performance but least influential as the first two constructs. This means, the project 
needs a form of legalisation and political support to perform (Campos, 2018). The 
article cannot support the hypothesis that the construct “project’s quality” has a 
positive effect on the performance. This “ranking” of the construct gives insight about 
which sectors the parties should concentrate on, to increase performance and the gains 
from the project. In the end, the “performance column” sums up the total gains of the 
PPP, which finally measures its overall success in the target sector.  
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3. MACROECONOMIC THEORY OF PPPS 
 
3.1 A brief history about PPPs 
 
Historically, before PPPs arrived, most of the services were state-owned, strongly 
regulated and the private sector was supervised by the welfare state. The wave of 
modern PPPs occurs in the US during the 70s and 80s13. This was a result of the 
energy- and economic crises of that time (oil-crisis) and the trend of economy-friendly 
policies by the government under Ronald Reagan (Newman, 2017). One of the reasons 
to break up the common state-own welfare system was that the state budgets were not 
strong enough to tackle these crises and were weakened to provide the needed efficient 
public services. During this time, it was necessary to deliver these services to the public 
using alternative ways. PPPs provide such an alternative program and the government 
uses this opportunity to reduce public spending and to increase private investment. 
First, it was for infrastructure projects, then it shifted to the financial sector, then to 
other sectors of public concern. Continuing, the PPPs began to spread all over the 
western civilizations.  
 
Western governments also use the tool of PPP also to boost their own efficiency among 
the state services through attracting professional expertise and capital from the private 
sector. One step was to deregulate the target sectors and change their structural and 
legal fundaments. By less regulations and less state supervision, private companies 
feel motivated to invest and join partnerships. Another step was to open for the 
financial sector, which brings the needed capital into the joint ventures. All those 
developments were taken in the last years, with the reduction of the overregulating 
state and the spread of private economic expansion. This idea of economy nowadays 
is becoming the common sense of how western states are running their policies14.  
 
 
 
 
13 The author found some earlier examples throughout history for PPPs. For this thesis, he limits his  
     findings on the types of PPPs the public knows today.  
14 This picture has of course its advantages and disadvantages but this is part of another discussion 
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3.2 Basic assumptions  
 
As noticed from the historical development of PPPs, there are two basic motives for 
countries in forming such partnerships. Firstly, countries want to increase private 
investment and second, they want to reduce public spending. In the formula of the 
expenditure approach15, the effect of PPPs would result in this:  
 
             Y ↑ = C + I ↑ + G ↓ + N       or     I > G (1) 
Where Y = GDP  
           C = Consumption  
            I = Investment  
           G = Government spending  
           N = trade deficit (N = export – import) 
 
The expenditure approach (see equation 1) assumes that with the two basic motives, 
PPPs would have a positive effect on GDP. To mention in this case, is that the private 
investments must balance or even outline the loss of government spending, to obtain 
this positive effect on GDP. Another option would be an increasing consumption of 
the service by the users. 
 
There are more motives for states to determine in a PPP-scenario, which are not 
represent in the expenditure approach. These are the interest in increasing employment 
and raising capital. These two factors occur when there is an increase of private 
investment in this sector. The factors and their influence on national product Y can be 
solved by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function. This function plays a 
fundamental role in Solows Growth model (La Grandville, 2009):  
 
 
 
 
 
15 The expenditure approach is a common tool to summarize the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
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             𝑌𝑡 = 𝑧𝐹(𝐾𝑡 , 𝐿𝑡)  (2) 
Where Y = net output (also GDP)  
            t = specific time period 
            z = factor multiplier for inputs16 
           F = short cut for “Function of”     
           K = capital  
           L = labour  
 
Rewritten the aggregate production function is:  
 
              𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴 ∙  𝐾𝑡
𝑎 ∙ 𝐿𝑡
1−𝑎  (3) 
Where A = technology 
            α = production elasticities 
           
This aggregate production function (see equation 2) states that growth17 depends on 
the sum of capital and labour at time t by the factor of z. Equation 3 replaces z with A, 
means that capital and labour are affected by the current level of technology (La 
Grandville, 2009). Without the factor A, sustainable long-run growth is not achievable 
only with capital or labour 18. The Greek letter α stands for the production elasticities, 
mention α < 1. According to the previous statement and to this model, PPPs 
contributing more capital and labour to an economy which have a positive effect on 
GDP, but there is the need for a continuing technical process19(La Grandville, 2009).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Multiplier z implies a homogenous function, which mean zF(t) (K(t), L(t)) = F(t) (zK(t), zL(t)) 
17 Growth means the growing augmentation of production and capacities within an economy 
18 To learn more about the Solow Grow Model, the author recommends reading La Grandville / Solows  
    “Economic growth: A unified approach” 
19 A similar approach are made by E. F. Buffie with his article ”Macroeconomic dimensions of 
    public-private partnerships” where he uses a dynamic general equilibrium model.  
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3.3 Economic models for a PPP-scenario 
 
Models display the theory of economic statements and principles. They should give 
the reader a compromised, simplified view on certain economic realities and 
behaviours20. Modelling PPPs is difficult, because of the many factors to consider. 
Especially, if they should represent their effect on economy. First, this attempt of 
modelling PPPs builds on the basic assumptions and the promises of economic 
outcomes for the participants.  
 
For the expenditure approach, we can assume that an increasing private investment 
(where I>G) leads to enough capital to run the project and insure good project 
performance. Good project performance is the main aspect for a state to support a PPP, 
because the state wants to generate income, which directs to a positive, steadily 
growing GDP (La Grandville, 2009).  
Figure 5 shows the effects of PPPs from Solow’s point of view, written in equation 2:  
 
 
Figure 5 Solows growth model for PPPs (own adaption) 
 
 
 
20 A famous model in that case is the supply and demand-model. 
Y
K 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑧1𝐹(𝐾𝑡 , 𝐿𝑡) 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑧2𝐹(𝐾𝑡 , 𝐿𝑡) 
 
45° 
16 
 
As we can read from this Solow-Growth-Model, with increasing capital K, growth Y 
will return to a constant base in the long run. Long-run growth is only reachable with 
the variety of other inputs z, for example technology etc. For PPPs, that would mean 
if the project partners want to have sustainable growing benefits from the project, they 
need to expand their services, managerial skills and expertise (La Grandville, 2009).  
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4. MICROECONOMIC THEORY OF PPPS 
 
4.1 The optimization problems within a PPP 
 
This chapter provides a better understanding about the planning procedure of such a 
PPP on the theoretical level, there is a need for mathematical formulations to display 
the optimization problems, the state and the investor have before the project start, to 
identify their interests. Lavlinskii´s article “Comparison of Models of Planning Public 
Private Partnerships” gives such mathematical formulas which represents the 
objectives of the players (Lavlinskii et al, 2016). It is important to note that, Lavlinskii 
assumes that both players choose rationally their best options. 
 
4.1.1 Basic assumptions and notations  
 
Following notations are:  
- T is the set of time periods 
- O is the set of industrial projects provided by the investor. He chooses the 
configuration of this projects depending on the state requirements (Lavlinskii 
et al, 2016).  
- J is the set of infrastructural projects provided from the state. The state chooses 
specific projects with long term prospects based on their estimated efficiency 
(Lavlinskii et al, 2016).  
- E is the set of environmental projects which are need to compensate eventual 
negative externalities of the projects (Lavlinskii et al, 2016). 
- Infrastructural project i in time t is described as cash flow 𝑀𝐹𝑜𝑡21 (differences 
between revenue and expenditures; MF = Money Flow / cash flow), cost 
estimation for environmental losses 𝐸𝐿𝑜𝑡 (EL = Environmental Losses), the 
budget income 𝐵𝐼𝑜𝑡 (BI = Budget Income) and the salary expectation of the 
population 𝑆𝑜𝑡 (S = Salaries / wages) when the project´s starts (Lavlinskii et al, 
2016). 
 
21 The author has to change the different signs and letters of certain equations to meet the thesis  
    requirements. The change does not affect the result nor the outcome of the optimization problems 
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- Infrastructural projects j in time t is described as investment costs 𝐼𝑁𝑗𝑡(IN = 
Investments), again the cost estimation for environmental loss 𝐸𝐿𝑗𝑡, the non-
project budget revenues 𝐵𝐼𝑗𝑡 and the paid salary in time t 𝑆𝑗𝑡 (Lavlinskii et al, 
2016).  
- The environmental projects e is described as project costs 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑡(EE = 
Expenditure for Environment), environmental income 𝐸𝑅𝑒𝑡 (ER = 
Environmental Revenue) and salaries 𝑆𝐸𝑒𝑡  (SE = Salaries for Environment) 
(Lavlinskii et al, 2016).  
- Matrices μ and υ stand for the interconnection of the projects. Note the 
technological connectivity indicator of industrial / infrastructural projects is 
μ𝑜𝑡, which is 1 when an infrastructure project requires an industrial project, 
otherwise 0. The connectivity indicator υ𝑜𝑒𝑝 defines that when there is a need 
for an environmental project after the implementation of industrial project, 
which is equal 1 when it is required, otherwise 0 (Lavlinskii et al, 2016). 
- Matrices Θ and θ represent the discounts for the state and investor, related to 
their budgets 𝐵𝑡 (budget state) and 𝑏𝑡(budget investor) (Lavlinskii et al, 2016).  
- Specific partnership mechanism are described with following variables: 𝑥𝑗 =
1 if the state runs a infrastructure project j, otherwise 𝑥𝑗 = 0; 𝑤𝑒 = 1 if the 
state runs an environmental  project, otherwise 𝑤𝑒 = 0; 𝑞𝑜 = 1 and 𝑢𝑒 = 1 if 
the investor runs the oth industrial and the epth environmental projects, 
otherwise 0 (Lavlinskii et al, 2016). 
- In case of a PPP cooperation, the state will take over eventually some of the 
environmental projects from his private partner. The investor must maintain 
data about the value of the environmental help. The variable ŵ𝑒 = 1 if the state 
takes control over the environmental projects from his investor partner, 
otherwise 0 (Lavlinskii et al, 2016). 
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4.1.2 The state´s problem 
 
The interests of the state´s and its population is to maximize their net present value 
(NPV) from this PPP22. For the state, the costs of the PPP should not exceed the given 
budget (Lavlinskii et al, 2016)23.  
 
max
𝑥,𝑤,ŵ,𝑞,𝑢
→  ∑ ( ∑ (𝐵𝐼𝑜𝑡 + 𝑆𝑜𝑡 − 𝐸𝐿𝑜𝑡)𝑞𝑜 + ∑ (𝐵𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝑆𝑗𝑡 − 𝐸𝐿𝑗𝑡 −𝑗∈𝐽𝑜∈𝑂𝑡∈𝑇
 𝐼𝑁𝑗𝑡)𝑥𝑗 + ∑ (𝐸𝑅𝑒𝑡 + 𝑆𝐸𝑒𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑡)𝑒∈𝐸 𝑤𝑒 + ∑ (𝐸𝑅𝑒𝑡 + 𝑆𝑒𝑡)𝑢𝑒𝑝)𝑒∈𝐸 / (1 +
 𝛩)𝑡                                                                                                               (4) 
 
       
With respect to the constraints:  
 
              ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑗𝑡𝑥𝑗 + ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑝𝑡ŵ𝑒𝑝 ≤  𝐵𝑡,             𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑒𝑝∈𝐸𝑃𝑗∈𝐽                       (5) 
 
             (𝑤, 𝑞, 𝑢) ∈ Ḟ(𝑥, ŵ)                         (6) 
 
               𝑥𝑗, ŵ𝑒𝑝 ∈ {0,1}                                                                                            (7) 
 
Function (4) represents the maximization of the state´s NPV, in respect to the costs of 
the implementation of the chosen projects, restricted by the state´s budget (5). The first 
term of (4) states the budget income of the state of the program the investor chose and 
the income of the population in form of wages, reduced by the environmental losses. 
The second term represents additional budget income and additional income of the 
population from an implemented program related to its expenses and environmental 
losses. In the third term, all environment projects are groups with their incomes, the 
wages for the population, the costs and expenses of the state for aiding the investor. 
All terms are divided by the discount for the state at the specific time t. Constraint (6) 
takes the optimal investor decision in account, if the state chooses to help the investor 
with an environmental project24 (Lavlinskii et al, 2016). Constraint (7) implies that 
 
22 Which is assumedly the quality of the service and the overall welfare (social net gains) 
23 The following model is a so called “bi-level model”. It is a model where one optimization problem 
    contains another optimization problem as a constraint (Sinhar et al, 2017).  
24 For example cost sharing, fundings, profit maximization etc. 
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variables x and ŵ are a choice between value 0 and value 1. The set of Ḟ(x,ŵ) contains 
the optimal solution for the investor. 
 
4.1.3 The investor´s problem  
 
To define the investor´s problem, there is the relevant assumption that variables x and 
ŵ equal 1, means the state seeks a cooperation with an investor, including his interest 
in the optimal solution25.  
 
             max
𝑞,𝑢
→ ∑ (∑ 𝑀𝐹𝑜𝑡𝑞0 − ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑝)/(1 + 𝜃)
𝑡
𝑒𝑝∈𝐸𝑃𝑜∈𝑂𝑡∈𝑇                           (8) 
 
With constraints:  
 
               𝑥𝑗 ≥ 𝜇𝑜𝑗𝑞𝑜 ,   𝑜 ∈ 𝑂,    𝑗 ∈ 𝐽                                                                            (9) 
 
             𝑤𝑒 + 𝑢𝑒 ≤ 1,   𝑒 ∈ 𝐸                                                                                    (10) 
 
               𝑤𝑒 + 𝑢𝑒 ≥ υ𝑜𝑒𝑞𝑜 ,   𝑜 ∈ 𝑂,   𝑒 ∈ 𝐸                                                                (11) 
 
               𝑞𝑜 ≥ υ𝑜𝑒(𝑤𝑒𝑝 + 𝑢𝑒𝑝),   𝑜 ∈ 𝑂,   𝑒 ∈ 𝐸                                                        (12) 
 
             𝑤𝑒 ≤ ŵ𝑒,    𝑒 ∈ 𝐸                                                                                        (13) 
 
             ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑒∈𝐸 −  ∑ 𝑀𝐹𝑜𝑡𝑞0  ≤  𝑏𝑡𝑜∈𝑂 ,   𝑡 ∈ 𝑇                                              (14) 
 
               ∑ ( ∑ (𝑆𝑜𝑡 − 𝐸𝐿𝑜𝑡)𝑞𝑜 +  ∑ (𝑆𝑗𝑡𝑗∈𝐽𝑜∈𝑂𝑡∈𝑇 − 𝐸𝐿𝑗𝑡)𝑥𝑗 +  
               ∑ (𝐸𝑅𝑒𝑡 + 𝑆𝐸𝑒𝑡)(𝑤𝑒 + 𝑢𝑒))/(1 + 𝛩)
𝑡 ≥ 0𝑒∈𝐸                                             (15) 
 
               ∑ (∑ 𝑀𝐹𝑜𝑡𝑜∈𝑂 𝑞𝑜 − ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑒)/(1 + 𝜃)
𝑡 ≥ 0𝑒∈𝐸𝑡∈𝑇                                    (16) 
               𝑤𝑒, 𝑞𝑜 , 𝑢𝑒 ∈ {0,1},   𝑜 ∈ 𝑂, 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸                                                               (17) 
 
 
25 The following optimization problem is a “one-level model” 
21 
 
In this optimization problem, the investor wants to maximize his NPV26 (8) in respect 
to his budget constraint (14) and the interests of the users/citizens (15) (Lavlinskii et 
al, 2016). Constraints (9) and (11) balancing the connection between the industrial, 
infrastructural and environmental projects. Constraints (10) shows choice of 
environmental project whether started by the state or the investor (Lavlinskii et al, 
2016), taking the state´s quota (13) and the requirement of implementation of a 
production project (12) in account (Lavlinskii et al, 2016). Constraints 16 is a target 
function, meaning the result should be higher than 0 or equal 0. Constraints 17 states 
that the variables have either the value 0 or 1.  
 
4.1.4 Analysis of the optimization problems 
 
In the optimization problem of the state, constraints (1)-(4), rely on the cooperation 
with an investor and his choice on the optimal solution. This means the investor 
chooses the optimal solution for the state also. The state plans the implementation of 
an infrastructural project only when the state has a long-term payoff of his investments 
(Lavlinskii et al, 2016). Consequently, the investor is planning on long-term 
arrangements to meet the state´s interests (Lavlinskii et al, 2016), trying to avoid 
potential losses in reputation. Here, the investor has to align his prior interest with the 
interests of the public and the state. The final outcome of this model is the development 
program for the region, considering the different kinds of projects and a cost sharing 
mechanism between the state and the private investor (Lavlinskii et al, 2016). There is 
a chance that the state can simplify his optimization problem if he gain access and 
control over the resources of the investor.  
 
Throughout the tests and based on the results, Lavlinskii (2016) argues that the state 
actually prefers a one-level optimization rather than the bi-level optimization. In the 
one-level model, the state and the investor can interact on the traditional range, bearing 
in mind the interest of population. In this interaction, Lavliinski (2016) states that the 
state should play the leading role in the cooperation, because the state need to make 
the decision in consideration of his budgetary constraints and the effectiveness of the 
project. To decrease negative effects on the environment, the reduction of 
 
26 Assumingly to maximize his profit pools and other financial gains 
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infrastructural constructions and more environmental projects are needed, which leads 
to a lowest possible profit margin for the investor (Lavlinskii et al, 2016). On contrary, 
the investor prefers the bi-level optimization. The bi-level model provides advantages 
for the investor, where he can generate more value. The reason for this is that in a bi-
level model, the value of the objective function does not depend on the state´s discount 
and stays constant when technologies are used which can influence the environment 
(Lavlinskii et al, 2016).  
 
As a conclusion, Lavlinskii (2016) declares, after analysing the mathematical results 
of his study, that his described bi-level model is more suitable for finding compromises 
and ensures the long-term interest of all project partners. It can be used as a strategic 
instrument for planning PPPs and as a support tool for the decision-making process 
(Lavlinskii et al, 2016).  
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4.2 Game theory & PPPs 
 
A suitable model for analysing the inner struggles of a PPP theoretically is “Game 
Theory”.  According to Ping Ho´s article “Game theory and PPP” from 2013, Game 
theory can be defined as “conflict analysis” or “interactive decision theory”. Especially 
in PPPs, strategic decisions and interactions between the governments and its private 
partners playing a vital role for the performance of the project. To display the many 
issues and challenges27 the two players face, Game Theory provides a proper analytical 
framework to study the dynamics of each player´s strategy and provide solutions for 
those problems (Ping Ho, 2013)28. These frameworks could help that policy makers 
and private investors better coordinate with each other, to gain higher efficiency and 
effectiveness (Ping Ho, 2013).   
 
In his article from 2013, Ping Ho identifies two major crucial points in his research 
about PPPs: the unbalanced profit structure problem and the renegotiation/hold up 
problem. The two problems lead to an increase of transaction costs, which have a 
critical impact on PPP´s suitability as a proper alternative for a public project and its 
sustainability for the long run, especially when the governments are unexperienced 
and without any professional expertise. These transaction costs are related to 
moral/transactional hazards and inefficiency (Ping Ho, 2013). An unbalanced profit 
structure occurs, for example, when the original investors29 control the whole or a high 
amount of the procurement value30, but contributed only a small amount of capital to 
the procurement´s equity. So, the investors are in the position to compensate their 
investments in a short time, receiving financial gains easier and let the stakeholder pay 
for the potential losses of the project. Based on the assumption of the opportunistic 
behaviour of the players, the investor tries to get this favourable opportunity in an 
aggressive way. Also, an asymmetry of information between the state and investors 
can also lead to an unbalanced profit structure, if the investor gets access to relevant 
 
27 Opportunism, competitive behavior, negotiations etc. (Ping Ho, 2013)   
28 The author will not present the full extent of Ping Ho´s work, because it would exceed the scope of 
    the thesis. Therefore, the author reviews the most relevant points of Ping Ho´s article in this 
    chapter. 
29 Ping Ho is defining them in his article as promoters 
30 Here the value of the PPP itself 
24 
 
information before the state, he can use it for his own benefit31 (Ping Ho, 2013). The 
renegotiation/hold up problem can cause high additional costs for the state. After 
signing the contract, the state must “hold up” granted subsidies and bear for potential 
debts of the project. Therefore, when a project fails, the state has to pay the subsidies 
plus an additional amount to cover environmental and operational costs32, to avoid a 
possible insolvency. The state is forced to renegotiate the contract, which is, in some 
cases, not desired for the public, considering political and economic impacts (Ping Ho, 
2013). 
 
To diminish inefficiency in PPPs, Ping Ho (2013) proposes two approaches. The first 
approach is the search for long-term profit-oriented investors for the project. The 
second approach is the proposal of monitoring strategies to demotivate opportunistic, 
short-term profit-oriented players in joining the project. These approaches are limited 
by the different pace of both players to adjust to the proposed strategies33 (Ping Ho, 
2013).   
 
In the end of his article (2013), Ping Ho makes two conclusions. First, with a clear 
contingency framework, considering many relevant factors, the state is able to avoid 
the implementation of PPP, achieving high efficiency and project success. Secondly, 
he states when PPPs are implemented in the right projects, long-term profit-oriented 
investors are more suitable partners then short-term profit-oriented investors, because 
they have a higher motivation and higher interest on a successful running project (Ping 
Ho, 2013).  
 
 
31 There are many more different factors which play a role in these problems, the author tries to cover  
    the most relevant points. For more information, the author recommends Ping Ho´s article.  
32 caused by delays or other operational failures 
33 Ping Ho argues, that the state has a slow learning curve and the private investors have a fast learning 
    curve, towards equilibrium.  
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Figure 6 Interaction scheme of a PPP-Process (adapted from Ping Ho, 2013)   
 
Figure 6 displays the different interactions within a PPP, defined by Ping Ho. It 
represents the motives, strategies, the player´s attitude and their different contributions 
which they bring into the PPP.  
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5. CASE STUDY “TOLL COLLECT GMBH” 
 
5.1 Economic relevance of HGV transportations on motorways in Germany  
 
Because of its geological location in the centre of Europe, Germany is a so called 
“transit-country”. This means for the goods transport34 and the international trade 
between East and West Europe, Germany plays a vital role with its infrastructure and 
roads. In the last decade, goods transportation in Germany has increased steadily since 
today (Destatis35, 2019). Millions of tonnes are carried in Germany, primarily on 
German motorways and highways (Destatis, 2019). Transport via HGVs makes up the 
biggest share of transportation of goods, far more than rail- and waterways, between 
1997 till 2015 it grows by 70 percent to 83 percent (Broaddus & Gertz, 2008). The 
statistics proves the economic relevance and value of truck transportation in Germany.  
To compensate for the steady growth of transportation, the German federal 
government is planning with a growing demand for financial resources for 
maintenance and repair of its motorways36. Figure 7 displays the increase in federal 
investments in traffic from 2010 till 2018.  
 
 
Figure 7 Federal investments for infrastructure from 2010 till 2018, in billions (Adapted from the 
Federal Department of Finance, 2019)   
 
34 motorways, railways, waterways  
35 German Bureau of statistics.  
36 For maintenance and repair 
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As the Figure 8 shows, since the beginning of the 2000s, goods transport surpasses the 
passenger transport, with a small drop at 2008 due to the economic crisis between 2008 
and 2010. Also, this graph shows the rising importance of transportation for the transit-
country of Germany. Note that Germany, with around eighty million people, is the 
most populated country of the European Union. This means that transported goods 
have a higher travel ratio than the population. This is another indicator of the economic 
relevance of good transportation and the transportation industry in particular.  
 
 
Figure 8 Goods and passenger transport (adapted from Destatis, 2018) 
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5.2 History of “Toll Collect GmbH”  
 
5.2.1 Reasons  
 
The plan to introduce this kind of PPP to the public is based on several motivations 
and goals of the federal government of Germany37. The reason38 for the former 
government’s decision to start planning for a PPP is that they were partly prejudiced 
privatizing completely the toll system in favour of the private sector and were afraid 
of negative public relations. 
 
1) Rising trade: With the rise of trade, the transportation of goods also rose, especially 
on roads. With the fall of the DDR39 and with the ongoing extension of the European 
Union, Germany and its infrastructure became the focus of the internal European trade. 
The need for infrastructure is simultaneously growing with the traffic of trade. 
Therefore, public investments in road network are also growing (Broaddus & Gertz, 
2008). The domestic companies didn’t fight that toll system because their competitors 
have to pay the same fees and they received subsidies from the government. 
 
2) Creation of new financial sources: As already mentioned in subchapter 3.1, states 
often use PPPs to replace the traditional public procurement, which is often seen as 
“old-fashioned” and obsolete, with new ways of financial procurement. New capital 
sources of user fees40 and private investments should exist besides the taxes on gas and 
fuel, to minimize and cover public expenditures.   
 
3) Optimization of efficiency: Considering research papers and news articles, one of 
the major arguments for Toll Collect is that this PPP is more efficient than under 
traditional public management and to encourage new business operations which are 
beyond the public sector (Broaddus & Gertz, 2008). The PPP should bind private and 
public competences in the traffic sector and become so more profitable for the state.  
 
37 For this subchapter writes only about the planning and construction of the PPP. Critics to the PPP are 
    written in subchapter 5.3 and chapter 6 “Discussion”. 
38 Many of the reasons which are described in this subchapter are similar to the mentions in subchapter  
    3.1 
39 Deutsche Demokratische Republik (Democratic People´s Republic of Germany)  
40 Includes fees from foreign HGVs 
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4) Outsource responsibilities: A vital point in creating such a PPP for a state is 
outsourcing managerial responsibilities from the public sector to the private sector. 
Especially the transfer of the task of maintenance of the toll system and its internal 
processes, to reduce possible costs for the public. The state still a fair share of the 
collecting tolls, but the complete supervision of the project was in the hand of the PPP-
company.  
 
5) Environmental concerns: With growing trade there is also growing output of CO2-
emissions. In times where climate change plays a major part in political discussions 
and where the debate is on whether states should ban certain types of vehicles to reach 
climate goals, tolls can be one solution to diminish CO2 pollution. The struggle here 
is how to price the CO2 output of HGVs without having a negative effect of the 
economy.  Additional, subsidies were payed to companies, when they purchase cleaner 
and environmentally friendly HGV (Broaddus & Gertz, 2008).  
 
5.2.2 Structure & functionality of Toll collect  
 
The structure of Toll collect in Figure 9 is close to the model in Figure 2. The public 
sector is represented by the federal ministry of transport and traffic, the private sector 
with its three main lenders, the PPP-company Toll Collect GmbH and the users. The 
main actors of the private sector, also called “private consortium” are the German 
Telekom Deutschland AG41, Daimler Financial Services AG42 and the French 
company Cofiroute43. Those three companies are responsible for the funding of the 
project and receive in return the dividends, divided in 45:45:10 share (see Figure 10). 
The PPP manages the system process of the project, handles the accounting and collect 
the tolls from the users per year, which are flowing from the PPP to a trust account, 
then to the German state treasury (Broaddus & Gertz, 2008). For that, state covers the 
cost of the PPP (Broaddus & Gertz, 2008), measuring yearly incomes of around 650 
million euros (Broaddus & Gertz, 2008). 
 
 
41 Germany´s biggest telecommunication company 
42 A subsidiary of one of the major German car manufacturers 
43 A construction company, part of the Vinci Group 
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Figure 9 Structure model of Toll Collect (adapted from Broaddus & Gertz, 2008)  
The German HGV toll system44 works via a combination of satellite - and mobile 
communications technologies (see Figure 10).  
 
 
Figure 10 German HGV toll system (adapted from Broaddus & Gertz, 2008) 
Most transportation companies must equip all their HGVs with so called “Onboard 
Units (OBUs)”. These OBUs automatically log-in into the toll system when there are 
using the toll roads. The GPS signal locates the vehicles, to draw a digital route of the 
vehicle’s journey. The radio communication service is calculating then the overall 
distance of HGV, sending it to the system which invoices the responsible hauler 
 
44 Other European toll models are presented in Appendix 3 
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(Broaddus & Gertz, 2008). This kind of toll collection was in favour of the government 
because it was fair to those users without OBU and only targets the HGVs.  
 
5.2.3 Planning & introduction of Toll Collect  
 
Since the 1970s, the German government planned to introduce a toll system, because 
of the growing traffic and rising infrastructure costs. This system oriented on the swiss 
model, paying a fee for the usage of the motorways. 1995 the government implemented 
the so called “LKW-Vignette”, a license for driving HGVs on the motorways 
(Bedszent, 2018). The only difference between the German model and the Swiss model 
was that in the German system the vignette was only for the German highways 
“Autobahns”, in Switzerland the haulers need the permission for every road type (see 
Appendix 3). After the introduction of the German vignette, the haulers simply used 
the country roads to avoid the payment. Another solution for the toll problem was 
needed, therefore the government started to plan 1998 a public-private partnership. 
 
As a first step, the federal government started a bidding contest in 1999 for possible 
partners for the project. The requirements for being part of the PPP were knowledge 
in the field of tolls, experience in that sector and technological know-how. After a long 
selection process, the contract was signed in 2002 between the state and the private 
consortium of three companies45 to create a joint venture, Toll Collect GmbH 
(Bedszent, 2018). Note here that the contract of the project was under strictly 
concealment and not even parliament members have the right to look at the contract. 
The design and creation of the contract already generated costs of around 16 million 
euros for private consultant companies46. (Bedszent47, 2018) The start of the project 
was schedule two months after the signature of the contract, but it delayed around three 
years.  
 
 
 
 
45 Listed in subchapter 5.2.2 
46 These problems are important factors for the upcoming chapter “Discussion” 
47 Unfortunately, there is not an equally good report about Toll Collect in English. 
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The delay was caused by several lawsuits against rival consortiums in front of the 
European Court and the technical issues with several functions of the system. The rival 
consortiums sued against the choice in favour of Toll Collect because they suspected 
that the election was already made before the application period (Bedszent, 2018). This 
suspicion was grounded on two key facts about the partners. The stock price of 
Deutsche Telekom AG was falling during that time and as their biggest shareholder, 
the federal government tried to help them (Bedszent, 2018).  Also, the project partners 
hoped that their satellite- based toll system could be in charge of a future “EU-toll”, 
so the success of Toll Collect was a short-term and a long-term strategy in favour of 
the participants (Bedszent, 2018). The final start of the project was in the year 2005 
(Broaddus & Gertz, 2008).  
 
Another cause for the delay was the technical issues during the implementation which 
led to losses for the state. It took 16 months to run the toll system, even then it was not 
100 percent operational. Due to the delay, the state lost 100 million euro per month in 
toll income (Edelhoff et al, 2018). Also, private consortium had to reinvest around one 
billion euro for the final functionality of the system. Consequently, the government 
cancelled the current contract and sued Toll Collect for compensation. The total loss 
for the public was, according the state administration, around nine billion euros 
(Edelhoff et al, 2018). The lawsuit landed in front of a private arbitration court 
(Bedszent, 2018). This legal confrontation between the two parties costs the federal 
government around 250 million euros for attorneys (Edelhoff et al, 2018). This court 
estimated the real compensation sum much lower than the state´s calculation of the 
damages. The final judgement in this lawsuit was in 2018 and it led to the settlement 
payment of 3,2 billion euros for the state. According to sources, only 1,1 billion euro 
is going to be paid to the public, the rest of the sum should be offset over the next 
couple of years (Edelhoff et al, 2018).  
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5.3 Performance evaluation 
 
5.3.1 Abilities of Parties  
 
One criterion for the abilities of the parties is that their proficiency matches the purpose 
of the project. On the public sector side is the German department of traffic and 
infrastructure, which is traditionally responsible for the motorways. The private sector 
needs to close the gap of the state in efficiency and practice experience. The private 
partners of Toll Collect are chosen by the industrial sector there are operating. Telekom 
Deutschland AG for the communication and technology, Daimler Financial Services 
AG for any kind of financial service of vehicles and Cofiroute for consulting and 
construction for the toll system. All those proficiencies combined cause a positive 
effect on the project. Now taking in account Campos´ stand in which constructs are 
more significant for the project´s success, “abilities of parties” is rank 2 of the four.   
For Toll Collect, the abilities of the participants didn´t work out in the starting period. 
The delay was caused by the technical problems on the side of the private sector. That 
means already at the start the PPP was not fully functioning. This problem started a 
discussion between two sectors about responsibility, leadership and internal 
communication, also it raised doubt about the promised delivery of efficient skills of 
each party.  
  
5.3.2 The Project´s quality 
 
Campos stated in his article that the “project´s quality” have no significant effect on 
performance. The project “Toll Collect” is, after handling all starting problems 
running, delivering the planned output. Giving compliance- and discourse guidelines 
with the authorities helps the project company to construct a certain quality of the 
services.  
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5.3.3 The macroenvironment  
 
The macroenvironment of the industry, Toll Collect is operating, is suitable for such a 
project. For Campos’ model, the macroenvironment is still significant, because a 
project cannot positively perform if it is not in the right setting (Campos, 2018). 
Germany is with its infrastructure, traffic, geological location and economic power an 
appropriate place for Toll Collect. The economic relevance is given, with it also the 
political support by the government in reducing regulation in that field.  
 
5.3.4 The microenvironment 
 
The microenvironment within a PPP is the most significant “construct” for the success 
of the PPP, according to Campos. Especially, the factors of “appropriate risk allocation 
and sharing” and “strong private consortium” are the most discussed ones (Campos, 
2018). The first factor of “appropriate risk allocation and sharing” is usually arranged 
in the contract, which represents the foundation of the business environment with the 
responsibilities of the participants. In the case of Toll Collect, the current regulation is 
concealed, so there is no real knowledge of how the risks of the project are shared 
between the parties. 
 
The factor of “strong private consortium” is also present in Toll Collect. Two of the 
three private companies in the consortium playing a major role in the German 
economy. Every company is specialised in their own industry and bring the needed 
expertise and capital into the project to make its operation successful. The consortium 
is funding the project with expectation of growing returns at the end of a business year. 
To get the higher gains from the project, the consortium tries to increase its influence 
on the PPP´s business strategy. This behaviour lead to internal disputes which is one 
of the main reasons, why Toll Collect is nationalized today48.  
 
 
 
 
 
48 More to this fact in subchapter 5.4 
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5.3.5 PPP Performance  
 
The las construct of Campos´ model summarizes the other constructs and measures the 
total gains of the PPP, which gives a picture of the project´s overall performance. 
The total financial gains of Toll Collect are high, estimating around 4-5 billion euros 
in return every year between 2009 and 2018 (see Figure 12).  
 
 
Figure 11 Total incomes of the HGV Toll from 2005 till 2022, from 2018 till 2022 the blue field 
shows the prognosed income (adapted from Edelhof et al, 2018) 
Figure 13 shows that the overall performance, after the delay, generates high incomes 
for the state and the private sector. There is no open information about the operational 
and bureaucratic gains of the project are no open information available but based on 
the income development of the toll system, they should be positive. There were no 
competitive gains, because Toll Collect has a monopoly on the toll system on German 
motorways.  
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5.4 Current Status  
 
As mentioned, the present´s status of Toll Collect is that the PPP is nationalized since 
2018. In Figure 13 shows a projected income from 2018 to 2022 due the 
nationalization and the separation from the private sector. The reasons for the 
nationalization of Toll Collect was the ongoing scandals, organizational failures and 
the growing transaction costs around the PPP.   
The key moment for nationalization is the most recent scandal in 2017, where some 
high-ranked employees of Toll Collect were suspected of fraud. According to the 
responsible officials and police, Toll Collect invoiced over year irregular high costs to 
the state, including high success- and risk premiums plus contractual guaranteed 
dividends. Also included in the costs where expenditures which had nothing to do with 
business of Toll Collect, like an old-timer race event or private trips of managers 
(Edelhoff et al, 2018). The total sum of those fraudulent invoices is estimated to around 
300 million euros (Edelhoff et al, 2018). Edelhoff et al. (2018) describes this situation 
in his article for the German newspaper DIE ZEIT as “a contract with nearly risk-free 
profits for a private company, backed up by the state”. Edelhoff guesses the motive 
behind such a behaviour was that the private companies wanted to retrieve the 
investments, which they paid beginning of the project regardless of the means. 
Additionally, the state knew about the fraudulent behaviour of the management 
members, but responsible state representative decided not to act against it, because of 
fear that this affair would ruin the image of the PPP (Edelhoff et al, 2018). 
 
Another problem arises in 2018, which will cost the government a high amount of state 
capital, namely the lawsuits of different transport companies against the HGV toll. For 
the haulers, the current price level of the toll is too high, so they entered an objection 
against it. A court granted the objection, so the current reclamations for the haulers 
accumulates close to 1,75 billion euros (Bedszent, 2018).  
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After all these revelations, the government decided to let the contract with the private 
sector expire, making Toll Collect a public company in 2018 (Bedszent, 2018). 
Nevertheless, the former and current German ministers for infrastructure and traffic49 
had the opportunity to nationalize the PPP earlier in 2015, but they were convinced 
about the concept and success of Toll Collect, which lead to an extension of contract 
for three more years. After the extension period, they started to look for new private 
partners for the project, which was a questionable decision, leading to extensive 
criticism from the public. In addition to the new selection of new partners, they both 
planned to put Toll Collect in charge of an upcoming car toll. This plan was stopped 
by the European high court because the car toll would have discriminated other car 
drivers from EU member states50 (Posauner, 2019). 
 
49 Alexander Dobrindt and Andreas Scheuer 
50 In the author´s opinion, this topic is good example for political mismanagement 
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6. WHY DO PPPS FAIL? – A DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter discusses the question “why do PPPs fail?”. This chapter reviews the 
previous two chapters and evaluates the reasons for the malfunctions. For this 
discussion, the chapter states that a PPP fails when it reaches one of the three following 
stages: First, the PPP becomes a public company after the contractual time period. 
Second, the operation produced exceptional high costs during its operation period. 
Third, the grade of negative political and public reputation of the PPP, including the 
intensity of critics and reasonable displeasure towards a certain PPP. For a better 
oversight, this chapter structures the main discussion points in four segments. 
 
First, PPPs fail because of internal problems rather than external problems. There is 
no specific evidence of how the external environment51 has a negative effect on PPPs. 
Proof of this statement is Campos` conclusion that the macro environment is the least 
influential factor for the project performance52. The environment takes care of the 
legislation and the maintenance of that sector where the PPP is interacting. As 
described in the case study and in the theory part, the success of a PPP depends on the 
business decisions of its internal management, its structure of finance and on the 
relationship between the project partners. The case study and the microeconomic 
theory shows that conflicts of interest, contractual issues and legal disputes can have 
an outburst of transaction costs and contribute or even lead to external problems, in 
case of the case study to a lack of investment in infrastructure.  
 
Second, the analysis of PPP-performance is only based on hard data. “Hard data” is a 
very unreliable source of information, it provides non-detailed outcomes of internal 
processes. Such superficial data covers up errors and malfunctions, which leads to a 
misconception about the PPP. It is also obstructive for the truthful measurement of a 
project performance. Late exposure of the relevant detailed information affects 
negatively the image of the PPP, loses the trust of the stakeholders and future investors. 
In the case study, the PPP gained a damaging reputation and diminishing support from 
the public because of the secretive handling of data collection, contract details, the 
 
51 For this case, it is the state or the public 
52 See Chapter 2.4 
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unknown financial structure and lawsuits in front of a private court. All those factors 
played a part in the failing of the case company Toll Collect. The limited access to the 
relevant information is a threat to the PPP-success.  
 
Thirdly, planning mistakes are made on the microeconomic level, not on the 
macroeconomic level. For this segment, the theory part plays the leading role. 
Arguments for PPPs on a macroeconomic theoretical level are based on simple 
assumptions and hard data, which, as described in segment two, is misleading. 
Macroeconomic theory just assumes that more capital and more labour through PPPs 
leads to economic growth, without taking the moral hazards within the project into 
account. The microeconomic theory takes the mistakes and hazardous situations within 
a PPP into consideration. The researches implicate, that prioritising only macro-
economic objectives in the planning period, without bearing the superior interests of 
the potential private partners in mind, the responsible public contractors are facing the 
mentioned problems in the short- and long run. The microeconomic research outcomes 
which are related to PPPs are clear indicators for possible default of a PPP. All articles 
consulted for this thesis confirm this probability. This theoretical approach and its 
research findings on PPPs need to be a more influential input in the planning process 
and in political discussions. The optimization problems in chapter 4.1 and the game 
theory in chapter 4.2 reveal the possible complications which occur within a PPP and 
within the interaction between parties. Keeping these scientific findings in mind, future 
PPPs would have a diminishing rate of failures in contrast to their counterparts from 
the past and could save the public high sums of capital.  
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Fourthly, a major reason why PPPs fail is human misbehaviour. Throughout the 
research, human characteristics like greed, self-interest, opportunism are outstanding 
traits connected to PPP-failure. Any promising PPP-project can fail if there is human 
mismanagement. Ping Ho (2013) took some of those characteristics in account in his 
research and proved their importance in his research result. Also the case study 
verifies, that some of the events which lead to nationalization of Toll Collect are based 
on human misbehaviour, for example the extra cost for private pleasures and the high 
invoices. A lot of the decisions about the PPP are irrational rather than rational. The 
responsible political bodies knew from the fraudulent behaviour of the managers, but 
did not move against it because of fear for the image of the project. The sources of 
such misbehaviour53 are versatile 
 
 
 
 
 
53 culture, family, training etc.  
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7. SOLUTIONS FOR PREVENTING PPP-FAILURES  
 
This chapter proposes solutions for preventing a possible PPP-failure. These solutions 
are based on the economic theory, literature reviews and the case study for this thesis.  
One solution is the introduction of an optimized governance structure with a clear 
hierarchy. Such a structure can handle internal problems in a more efficient way and 
monitors the business process on a managerial level. The supervising boards are 
occupied by representatives of the state and private partners, to ensure each party´s 
interest. Additionally, a third party audits the actions of the boards independently and 
support business decisions. This party can be rather publically and privately, bounded 
on some regulations54, to guarantee its independency.  
 
Another solution is CSR-standards for PPP on a nation-wide level. Corporate social 
responsibility combines economic, social55 and environmental goals into one 
framework. This framework transformed into legal standards for the selection process, 
is useful for the state and potential partners. Investors can measure their possible gains 
from this project and therefore have security in planning long-term strategies. The state 
protects itself from uncertainties and moral hazards. Those standards keep away 
hazardous interest groups by putting the goals as a minimum requirement for a 
partnership and legal bottom lines. A CSR framework should provide the public and 
population insight of on which criteria a PPP delivers the service. By doing so, a PPP 
find the necessary support and understanding from its users about its right to exist. 
  
The last solution would be bringing more attention on the present findings of scientists. 
Economists like Ping Ho, Lavliinski, Hoppe, Hodge giving policy makers detailed 
information about the different factors which should be part of the planning process. 
PPPs nowadays merely rely on the promises of the project partners to increase 
economic growth. They do not take microeconomic concerns in account and so they 
face the already mentioned issues.  
 
 
54 Is not allowed to hold shares etc.  
55 higher transparency etc.  
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8. SOME OTHER ISSUES OF PPPS 
 
8.1 Conflict of interest  
 
In planning and leading of a PPP lies a high potential of conflict between the different 
interests of each faction. The goal of the participants is the growth their net present 
value of their share of the PPP. Chapter 4 represents this conflict of interest on a 
theoretical, analytical way. Lavliinski (2016) and, especially, Ping Ho (2013) confirm 
in their works the existence of such conflicts between the partners and the negative 
effects the conflicts can cause. Within a PPP, the views of the players on how the PPP 
is to be managed can vary from player to player, meaning a diverse opinion on long-
term strategies and leadership. In addition to this, the different characteristics of the 
players are also able to damage their relationship, characteristics like opportunism, 
competitive behaviour, etc., which can lead to diverse hazards (Estache & Saussier, 
2014) and unwanted high transaction costs (Ping Ho, 2013).  
 
Both researches state the two different objectives of maximization. The 
state/population wants to increase their welfare, the investor wants to increase his 
profits. It will be even more drastic, when the investor has to fulfil shareholder 
expectations, who aims to increase value56. Within those two different goals rests a 
kind of moral dilemma, which both players are involved in.  
 
To forecast possible conflicts based on a non-theoretical way, Campos’ critical success 
factors are useful. They show, based on empirical data and surveys, that for private 
entrepreneurs it is important to play a leading role in a PPP, to cover their interest. This 
claim can be seen in the CSF’s “strong consortium” and “appropriate risk allocation 
and sharing” (Campos, 2018). There, the entrepreneur chooses factors to undermine 
their interest to gain a leading position with the chance of risk sharing. Therefore, the 
more the risk is shared between partners, the more interesting is the project for the 
private sector.  
 
56 This thesis doesn´t go deeper into the relationship between investor and shareholder within a PPP. In 
     present-day economy it is fair to mention that the growth of shareholder value plays a role in 
     companies who are listed at the stock market. 
. 
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In the case of Toll Collect, the conflict caused high costs. The partners tried to settle 
their internal disputes, whose origins were the ongoing scandals and malfunctioning 
system, in front of a private court. A fact that shows how impossible it was to solve 
these problems in a “normal” managerial way. Reasons for this could be the 
contractual agreements or planning mistakes in the beginning.  
 
8.2 Transparency issue  
 
Transparency is an important trait in the interaction between two individuals. It 
exposes motives, ideas, interests and other important information for and about your 
counterpart. The more transparent and “honest” or “less secretive” people are to each 
other, the easier it is for both parties to build up a trustful relationship57. It is basically 
the same as the relationship between seller and buyer. When the seller is trustworthy 
and open, the buyer will return frequently. In return, a non-transparent interaction 
causes the opposite reaction. Non-transparency can cause difficulties in transferring a 
positive image or raise support for the project. A good example for non-transparency 
is Volkswagen´s behaviour during the diesel scandal (Lee, 2018). Therefore, to run a 
publically accepted PPP, it is vital to inform the user of the service and be transparent 
to the stakeholders.  
 
During the research for the case study, it was surprising to note how little the public 
knows about contractual details of the PPP “Toll Collect GmbH”. Even elected 
representatives have no full access to the contract. It is one part of a series of lacking 
transparency within PPPs, especially about the PPP in the case study (Bedszent, 2018). 
The transparency issue about the contract, which has around seventeen thousand pages 
on the responsibilities of the contract partners and is under absolutely concealment58, 
is not the only non-transparent fact which matters in this PPP. Also unknown are the 
methods of measurement about how successful all the processes are running and the 
amount of capital the project company gets from the overall toll revenue.  Every detail 
about business procedures and capital flows within the PPP between the contract 
 
57 For example marriages, friendship etc.  
58 Parts of the contract were published via Wikileaks. The author will not use this reference because of 
    legal concerns 
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partners are not being published from the government, which makes it hard to get a 
final evaluation about the performance and accomplishments of the PPP (Bedszent, 
2018). The government and his private partners tried to keep any critical voices away 
from the PPP. Most of the arguments they made for the PPP are based on the hard data 
about the yearly revenue.  When more and more newspaper started to report about the 
PPP and its non-transparency, the public started to question why important documents 
are under such a strict concealment. Till today none of the questions can be answered 
concretely.  
 
Another fact to mention correlated with that issue are the secret lawsuits in front of 
private courts. The settlements of the problems mentioned in subchapters 5.2.3 and 5.4 
are based in the judgement from a non-elected, private judge outside of the democratic 
system. This raises not only ethical and moral reservations, also it raises the question 
of whether a private judge could be biased in the moment of the ruling (Bedszent, 
2018).  
 
8.3 Monitoring issue 
 
Monitoring performance is a key aspect in running a common project. Proper 
monitoring provides necessary data and information about the current status and 
progress of a project. Pursued in the right way, it saves time, labour and financial 
resources in every single sector. But it is not necessarily self-explanatory that every 
project has the right monitoring procedures to detect internal errors.  
 
In case of PPPs, the issue with monitoring is substance of discussions. Too much 
monitoring and interferences can endanger the success, too little monitoring can 
discover internal transgressions too late. Another part of the discussion is who is 
responsible for the monitoring. If it is assigned to the public sector, a possible outcome 
of it could be that the project is getting overregulated59. When the private sector 
monitors the project, it would try to lower costs and expenditures of the project in 
favour to increase their profit share, then the service quality could suffer60.  
 
59 An example is the ”crowding-out-effect” 
60 In education, health care  
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A third possibility is that the project company itself monitors it. For “Toll Collect”, 
this kind of monitoring caused costs for the public sector. First, because of the delay, 
the state needed to save investments for infrastructure, which summed up to billions 
of euros, which were missing at the time of demand. Second, the management invoiced 
private expenditures to the state, so in fact to the taxpayer. This behaviour led to the 
lawsuit against Toll Collect because of fraud. The state did not monitor performance 
and financial flows, so the state kept paying for subjects, which had nothing to do with 
the company and the service61. If the state had monitored the business processes much 
earlier, they would have noticed the invoice fraud and reacted against it. So in the end, 
the taxpayer bears the costs for the mismanagement and the lack of proper monitoring, 
which could prevent this circumstance.  
 
8.4 Cost of errors  
 
The “Cost of Errors62” can be defined as follows:”The cost of errors are the 
accumulation of all losses, triggered by the malfunction of a project, which are hard 
to measure in the short run or not suitable to determine a numerical value”. This kind 
of costs includes opportunity costs, political reputation losses, welfare losses, 
efficiency losses and the losses based on negative externalities63, especially on the 
environment. These losses are hard to measure and their effects appear in the future. 
Especially in case of a failing PPP, which covers a particular public good/service and 
have an effect on the life of the population, it is difficult for policy maker and 
researcher to value these losses numerically, which could help to estimate the complete 
extent of a project failure. The cost of errors is a bias which policy maker should 
remember to protect the public from the possible negative outcome of the PPP.  
 
 
 
61 Even when the state knew about the fraud, the author assumes for the chapter, the state did not know 
62 The author couldn´t find a suitable term which characterizes such costs/losses. Therefore, the author 
    decided to create his own definition of such an circumstance. Please note that this is the author own  
    creation, it is not a common, certified explanation.  
63 Negative externalities are negative effects on a third, not-participating person. Like lung cancer  
    because of car traffic etc.  
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A good example of this cost concept is found in the case study. During the operation 
of Toll Collect, these costs were accumulating steadily. The full cost of this project 
costs to the public is not measurable. How much influence the CoE´s have on the 
political career of the responsible persons, how much welfare the public lost because 
of the failure and how much capital will be needed to compensate the negative 
externalities the PPP caused, all of these question can be only measured over long time 
period and cannot be answered in the short-run.  
 
8.5 Economic relevance & the lack of empirical evidence 
 
Throughout the literature review, the findings about the economic relevance of PPP 
are mixed. In their article, Fabre & Straub (2019) state that PPPs can have some 
efficiency gains, but they can´t prove that PPPs are, in their current form, the best 
solution. They researched different public sectors about the performance of PPPs, they 
found that PPPs have some influence, but they carry other problems in design and 
scale.  
 
Kwame Sundaram´s work from 2016 expresses that PPPs even turn out to be more 
expensive than the actual traditional procurement, because they can´t deliver the 
promised increase in service quality, including efficiency, development and coverage 
(Kwame Sundaram, 2016). The impact of PPPs highly depends on the sector, macro 
environment and the general lack of capital in specific regions.  
Hoppe (2013) formed in his article an experimental approach, to prove which 
procurement has the higher trade-off.  In the experiments, Hoppe (2013) found that 
PPPs have higher incentives to invest in cost reduction but only if the investments are 
used to enhance quality (Hoppe, 2013). Under the assumption that PPPs are making 
the desirable investments, PPPs are preferable (Hoppe, 2013). The experimental 
approach of Hoppe (2013) assumes that PPPs always chooses quality-enhancing 
option. Finally, Hoppe also states that investment can have positive and negative 
effects on quality, based on the forms of investments. 
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There are many different approaches of many researches who are trying to solve the 
question about the relevance and importance of PPP-model for an economy and a state. 
Because of the mixed outcome, the different methods and diverse mathematical 
formulations in those researches, there is no final evidence for the claim that PPPs are 
superior to traditional procurement.  
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9. CONCLUSION  
 
Finally, it is fair to say that in PPPs and in their advantages lie a great chance to replace 
the traditional public procurement, even there might not clear scientific proof for this 
idea (Kwame Sundaram, 2016). Nevertheless, these advantages signify a higher utility 
for a state by combining the professional expertise of public and private sector. This 
relationship is able to increase the efficiency and quality of public goods and services, 
boost employment and gain access to new sources of capital. These benefits of PPPs 
are mentioned correspondingly in the literature about PPPs and by the supporters. PPPs 
clearly play a major role in policy decisions of today and in the future. Overall, there 
is a positive image of PPPs in literature and about their contribution to economic 
growth according to the Solow-Model, analysed in chapter three.  
 
Despise the good theoretical approach of PPPs, many projects are failing over time. 
The reasons for the failure rates are based on managerial decisions and microeconomic 
errors during the implementation - and operation period of the project. Considering the 
microeconomic approach on PPP-failure, Lavliinski (2016) and Ping Ho (2013) 
pointing out especially the high potential of interest conflict between the partners. A 
good example of the conflict between partners is described in the case study. These 
internal problems lead to a high rate of malfunctions among such projects like Toll 
Collect. The opportunism of groups and single persons influences the management 
decision and effects so the overall PPP-performance. The scientific literature and the 
case study deliver evidences to this statement.  
 
As a conclusion, it is obvious that project partners or states need to take problems and 
issues with PPPs in stronger consideration in order to start a successful long-run 
project. A failing PPP has incalculable effects on the population64, because citizens 
depend on certain public goods and services. Therefore, actions are needed, to 
diminish the chance of human mismanagement and opportunistic behaviour.   Ping Ho 
(2013) suggests two methods: a clear framework of the project and the selection of 
long-term profit-oriented partners. Other methods would be a better governance 
structure and higher standards in CSR-practices. 
 
64 As can be seen in the case study 
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Further research in PPPs offers a variety of relevant topics, especially in the context of 
the economic relationship of public and private sector of today and in the future. But 
this research is only possible, if the researcher has full access to all information and 
data of a PPP during and after the PPP’s operations. This way, the researcher can 
guarantee an accurate research result and can terminate unknown values. For this 
chapter, the author proposes several future research subjects for PPPs.  
To determine which procurement form for a public good is now more favourable for 
all, a direct comparison between a PPP-company and its public equivalent is needed 
to answer this question. Tested under equal conditions, the findings can give more 
precise data about which form performed better. Such a comparison might be difficult 
to realise, because of the many factors and requirements, researchers have to respect 
in order to achieve a perfect outcome.   
Another subject is the influence of shareholder value and shareholder expectations on 
the overall PPP-management. In present-day economies, shareholder value plays a 
vital role in the strategic making of stock companies. It would be interesting to know, 
if PPPs who are linked to the stock market65 perform better or worse than non-linked 
companies.   
A research subject based of the human behaviour within a PPP. As mentioned in 
chapter six, human misbehaviour leads to a potential PPP-failure. The revelation of the 
motivations, reasons and psychological preconditions which leads to fraudulent 
behaviour within PPPs might be helpful for choosing future manager and trustful 
employees. 
A final recommendation is research on how much the economic and cultural mind-set 
contributes to the decision to create a PPP. Throughout the research about the selection 
process, it becomes clear that there exist more irrational arguments for PPPs than 
rational. This means, that decision makers could be aware of the disadvantages of some 
specific PPPs but still support the idea. Therefore, a possible topic is to find out which 
specific66 mind-set may support PPPs more and which mind-set supports it less. This 
research could also be a part of the previous research proposal about human behaviour.  
 
 
65 by companies, investors, promoters etc.  
66 cultural, economic, personal, social 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
Infrastructure Contract Nomenclature 
Contract 
Nomenclature 
Overview Description 
and Reference 
Type of 
Asset 
Functions 
Transferred 
Payment 
Source 
Design-Build-
Finance-
Operate-
Maintain 
(DBFOM); 
Design-Build-
Finance-Operate 
(DBFO); 
Design-
Construct-
Manage-
Finance 
(DCMF) 
Under this nomenclature, 
the range of PPP contract 
types is described by the 
functions transferred to the 
private sector. 
The maintain function may 
be left out of the 
description (so instead of 
DBFOM, a contract 
transferring all those 
functions may simply be 
described as DBFO, with 
responsibility for 
maintenance implied as part 
of operations). An 
alternative description 
along similar lines is 
Design-Construct-Manage-
Finance (DCMF), which is 
equivalent to a DBFOM 
contract. 
New 
infrastructure 
As captured by 
contract name 
Can be 
either 
government 
or user pays 
Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT), 
Build-Own-
Operate-
Transfer 
(BOOT), Build-
Transfer-
Operate (BTO) 
This approach to describing 
PPPs for new assets 
captures legal ownership 
and control of the project 
assets. Under a BOT 
project, the private 
company owns the project 
assets until they are 
transferred at the end of the 
contract. BOOT is often 
used interchangeably with 
BOT, 
as Yescombe (Yescombe 
2007) describes. In 
contrast, a Build-Transfer-
Operate (BTO) contract, 
asset ownership is 
transferred once 
construction is complete. 
As Delmon (Delmon 
2015, 20–21) describes, 
ownership rights mainly 
affect how handover of 
assets is managed at the end 
of the contract. 
New 
infrastructure 
Typically, 
design, build, 
finance, 
maintain, and 
some or all 
operations 
Under some 
definitions, 
BOT or BTO 
may not 
include private 
finance, 
whereas BOOT 
always includes 
private finance 
Can be 
either 
government 
or user pays 
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Rehabilitate-
Operate-
Transfer (ROT) 
In either of the naming 
conventions described 
above, Rehabilitate may 
take the place of Build 
where the private party is 
responsible for 
rehabilitating, upgrading, or 
extending existing assets. 
Existing 
infrastructure 
As above, 
but rehabilitate 
instead of build 
As above 
Concession 
Concession is used for a 
range of types of contract, 
as described 
in Delmon (Delmon 2010, 
Box 1 on page 9). In some 
jurisdictions, concession 
may imply a specific type 
of contract; while in others 
it is used more widely. In 
the PPP context, a 
concession is mostly used 
to describe a user-pays 
PPP. For example, in 
Brazil, the Concession Law 
applies only to user-pays 
contracts; a distinct PPP 
Law regulates contracts that 
require some payment from 
government. On the other 
hand, concession is 
sometimes used as a catch-
all term to describe a wide 
range of PPP types—for 
example, all recent PPPs in 
Chile have been 
implemented under the 
Concession Law, including 
fully government-pays 
contracts. 
New or 
existing 
infrastructure 
Design, 
rehabilitate, 
extend or build, 
finance, 
maintain, and 
operate—
typically 
providing 
services to 
users 
Usually user 
pays—in 
some 
countries, 
depending 
on the 
financial 
viability of 
the 
concession, 
the private 
party might 
pay a fee to 
government 
or might 
receive a 
subsidy 
Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) 
The United Kingdom was 
one of the first countries to 
introduce the PPP concept 
under the term Private 
Finance Initiative, or PFI. 
It is typically used to 
describe a PPP as a way to 
finance, build and manage 
new infrastructure. 
New 
infrastructure 
Design, build, 
finance, 
maintain— 
may include 
some 
operations, but 
often not 
providing 
services 
directly to users 
Government 
pays 
Operations and 
Maintenance 
(O&M) 
O&M contracts for existing 
assets may come under the 
definition of PPP where 
these are performance-
based, long-term, and 
involve significant private 
investment (sometimes also 
called performance-based 
maintenance contracts). 
Existing 
infrastructure 
Operations and 
maintenance 
Government 
pays 
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Affermage 
An affermage contract is 
similar to a concession, but 
with the government 
typically remaining 
responsible for capital 
expenditures. Affermage in 
particular may have a 
specific meaning in some 
jurisdictions. The World 
Bank’s explanatory 
notes on water 
regulation (Groom et al. 
2006, 36–42) describe lease 
contracts, as well as 
concessions. Such contracts 
may or may not come under 
the definition of PPP, 
depending on the duration 
of the contract. 
Existing 
Maintain and 
operate, 
providing 
services to 
users 
User pays—
private party 
typically 
remits part 
of user fees 
to 
government 
to cover 
capital 
expenditures 
Management 
Contract 
The state retains asset 
ownership, and capital 
expenditure is the 
responsibility of the public 
sector, whereas operation 
and maintenance is the 
handled by the private 
sector. These types of 
contracts are 3-5 years in 
duration. 
Existing 
Operations and 
maintenance 
Management 
fees 
extended to 
the 
contractor 
Franchise 
Franchise is sometimes 
used to describe an 
arrangement similar to 
either a concession or a 
lease or affermage contract, 
as described 
in Yescombe (Yescombe 
2007). 
Existing or 
new 
May include 
design, build, 
and finance, or 
may be limited 
to maintaining 
and operating 
an asset 
User or 
government 
pays 
(Source: World Bank, 2017)  
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Appendix 2 
Critical Success Factors for PPPs
(Source: Campos, 2018)  
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Appendix 3 
Types of HGV tolling systems in Europe  
 
(Source: Broaddus & Gertz, 2008)  
 
